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The long road to economic recovery from the COVID-19 shock is just beginning. European 
countries are considering how best to reboot their economies, with fiscal stimulus plans at 
the core of the consideration. Meanwhile, the European Commission has put forward its 
own stimulus plan. These stimulus packages will amount to several percentage points of 
GDP, and can therefore influence the future orientation of the economic system. For this 
reason, policymakers aim to incorporate long-term goals into recovery packages, most 
fundamentally a just transition towards a climate-neutral economy. 
POLICY CHALLENGE
Greening the recovery is a significant policy challenge. While there are clearly recovery 
policies that have positive effects on greening the economy, such as promoting energy 
renovation of buildings, there is a limit to the proportion of stimulus that can be explicitly 
greened. Beyond focusing on the explicit greening of stimulus policies where possible, 
greater emphasis should thus be placed on altering expectations, so that market agents 
anticipate higher future pay-offs from low-carbon investment. The European Union needs 
to announce today a significant increase in carbon prices after 2021, to be engineered 
through revisions of the Emission Trading System and the Energy Taxation Directive. Such 
reforms could provide annual additional revenues of €90 billion. This could make a major 
contribution to the post-COVID-19 fiscal consolidation requirements, which might be in 
the order of one percent of GDP per year.  
TWO PILL ARS FOR A SUCCESSFUL GREEN RECOVERY
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• Some stimulus policies have dual benefits: quick, 
targeted, effective, while cutting carbon emissions
• These must be at the core of stimulus packages
Why?
• Much stimulus spending 
cannot be greened
• Major consolidation needs
• Carbon pricing makes big 
contribution to both
How?
• Price floor guarantees 
mean higher ETS price
• ETD reform with stronger 
link to carbon content of 
fuels and higher prices
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Amid the chorus of voices calling for the 
post-COVID-19 recovery to be a green re-
covery1, it is often overlooked that a sim-
ilar narrative was developed in 2008, as 
Europe and the world designed their re-
covery plans in the aftermath of the great 
financial crisis. The rationale for a green 
approach was clear then and is clear now: 
the disruption, in this case caused by the 
pandemic, offers an opportunity to build 
a new eco-friendly system, for the benefit 
of current and future generations.
But pursuing a green recovery might 
not be as straightforward as one might 
think. Trade-offs must be weighed 
between the need to provide a short-term 
stimulus to the economy and the need to 
address the long-term challenge posed 
by global warming. In the short term, 
there is a clear limit to the proportion of 
effective short-term stimulus that can 
be explicitly greened. Green conditions 
can be attached to public investment 
and the support given to companies, 
but the experience of 2009-2010 in the 
euro area showed that about half of the 
total stimulus comprised cuts to direct 
and indirect taxation, social security 
contributions, or direct income support – 
in other words, measures to keep current 
activities going, rather than to give them 
a new green direction.
For this reason, in order to turn the 
green recovery vision into practice, it 
is important in response to COVID-19 
to do what was not done sufficiently 
in 2009-2010, which is to have a clear 
understanding of both the economic 
impacts and the economic policy 
response, and to then properly integrate 
the green component into the recovery. 
In particular, greening the recovery 
needs to be thought of as a long-term 
project, and measures should be taken 
now to alter expectations so that market 
agents receive the clear message that 
low-carbon investment will from now 
on generate the largest pay-offs. In the 
European Union setting, the main avenue 
via which a ‘green consolidation’ – or an 
embedding of the green recovery – can be 
achieved would be to ensure a significant 
and durable rise in carbon prices after 
2021.
1 COVID-19: THE ECONOMIC POLICY 
RESPONSE
The economic policy response to 
COVID-19 involves three phases: relief, 
recovery and fiscal consolidation.
In phase 1, governments put in place 
indiscriminate and national-based 
measures to keep firms and workers 
afloat in the face of near-universal 
cash shortfalls. As the economic crisis 
becomes longer and bankruptcy risks 
loom, governments will also have to 
provide solvency support through direct 
recapitalisation to certain, selected, firms 
(Anderson et al, 2020).
In phase 2, governments – along with 
EU support – will put in place measures 
to reboot their economies from the severe 
contraction, with interventions aimed at 
stimulating both aggregate demand and 
supply. This can be attempted directly via 
increases in government expenditure, or 
indirectly via incentive mechanisms to 
increase investment/consumption from 
the private sector (Bénassy-Quéré et al, 
2020). As a second wave of the epidemic 
is possible, this phase might be at certain 
points be also accompanied by a return 
of phase 1 measures2.
In Phase 3, governments will have 
to implement fiscal consolidation 
measures. Relief and recovery policies 
will significantly increase public debts 
across Europe. Darvas (2020) has shown 
how European countries with higher 
initial levels of debt might see alarming 
increases. Typical measures would 
include increases in taxation or cuts to 
public spending. Already in the relief 
and recovery phases, the expectations of 
companies and households about future 
consolidation measures are important 
and will guide investment decisions. 
This is where the concept of ‘green 
consolidation’, specifically commitments 
made today to higher carbon prices in 
the future, will be pivotal for stimulating 
green investments today. 
As the economic policy discussion 
advances towards the design of the 
recovery phase, it is important to 
integrate the green element into the 
complete set of criteria that policymakers 
will use to inform their recovery policies.







2.   Questions must also be 
asked about how effective 
government stimulus can 
be at boosting aggregate 
demand in an environment 
in which agents suspect 
that another lockdown and 
stop to business might be 
around the corner.
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2 GREEN, FAIR AND EFFECTIVE: 
A SET OF CRITERIA TO ASSESS 
RECOVERY POLICIES
A wide range of policies can contribute 
to economic recovery. The decision on 
the right policy mix will depend on which 
policies are most effective at stimulating 
the economy, and on what other short- 
and longer-term effects they might have. 
Here, we list three criteria for policy-
makers to consider when determining a 
portfolio of recovery policies: effective 
promotion of economic growth, fairness 
and the green recovery.
2.1 EFFECTIVE PROMOTION OF ECONOMIC 
GROWTH
The basic idea behind recovery poli-
cies is use of public money to stimulate 
aggregate demand. The expectation is 
that each euro of public money will not 
only imply an increase in demand for 
goods and services worth the exact same 
euro, but that the suppliers of the goods 
and services will use the extra income 
to themselves demand additional goods 
and services, and so forth. The greater 
the impact on GDP of each euro of public 
spending (the so-called multiplier), the 
stronger the recovery will be, given a 
fixed amount of spending.
But estimating the multiplier of 
individual recovery policies – let alone 
entire recovery programmes – is complex. 
Theoretically, we know that the lower the 
share of money leaked from the domestic 
economic cycle in the form of savings 
or imports, the higher the multiplier of 
a policy will be. We know that policies 
that are able to stimulate demand that is 
passed through extensive national value 
chains will have high multipliers. For 
example, a policy stimulating demand 
for automobiles will have significant 
knock-on demand effects for industries 
feeding into the final product, such as 
steel, aluminium, plastics and rubber. 
Meanwhile, if stimulus is absorbed 
by those with high savings rates, the 
multiplier will be lower. An example 
would be a cut to the highest income tax 
bracket, benefitting wealthier people 
with relatively higher saving rates3. It is 
also not necessarily the case that policies 
with the highest GDP multipliers have 
also the highest employment multipliers. 
Furthermore, the multiplier also depends 
on a variety of other factors, including 
the specific situations in which recovery 
measures are applied4, the speed 
with which recovery programmes are 
deployed5, the size of the measures6 and 
their eventual targeted nature7.
Although the main focus of stimulus 
packages is to boost aggregate demand 
through anti-cyclical stimulus, govern-
ments must consider the effects of stim-
ulus on long-term sustainable economic 
growth. In the same way that the Great 
Depression accelerated a large structural 
shift in the US automobile manufactur-
ing sector (Bresnahan and Raff, 1992) it 
is likely that the current economic crisis 
provides an opportunity for structural 
supply-side shifts. As businesses rethink 
value chains, and as governments inject 
stimulus into depressed economies, 
their role in shaping future growth is 
larger than during normal times. In 2020, 
the key challenge for governments is to 
provide effective signals encouraging 
supply-side restructuring and rationalisa-
tion, to be based upon a shift away from 
carbon-based production.
2.2 FAIRNESS
Individual recovery policies can have 
very different distributional effects. For 
example, lump-sum transfers to low-in-
come households are progressive, while 
state aid to capital-intensive industries is 
regressive. There can be positive and neg-
ative interactions between the fairness 
criteria and other objectives. For in-
stance, helping poorer credit-constrained 
households can reduce inequality and 
generate above-average multipliers 
(Palagi et al, 2017). On the other hand, 
reducing energy taxes can be a stimulus 
policy that quickly supports low-income 
households much more than high-in-
come households, but might imply in-
creasing energy consumption and hence 
greenhouse gas emissions. We know that 
income tax cuts disproportionately help 
the rich, social contribution cuts help the 
middle class, and most consumption tax 
cuts help the poorest.
Despite the high volume and political 
importance of fairness in the design of 
3. See, for instance, Tenhofen 
et al (2010) on the macro-
economic effects of exoge-
nous fiscal policy shocks in 
Germany.
4. Buchheim et al (2018) 
found that a solar 
photovoltaic installation 
programme created many 
jobs in labour markets that 
featured a lot of slack, but 
close to none in empty 
labour markets.
5. If the crisis runs too long 
then self-reinforcing cycles 
might draw the economy 
unnecessarily low. How-
ever, policies take time to 
implement and to become 
effective, and multipliers 
take time to kick-in.
6. Even well-balanced poli-
cies with many positive and 
limited negative spillovers 
might not help much if they 
cannot be brought to the 
necessary scale to increase 
aggregate demand in a 
country.
7. Some policies allow target-
ing of specific regions, sec-
tors or population groups. 
Such targeting cannot only 
be helpful for the political 
economy, but it might also 
increase effectiveness.
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programmes, the distributional effects of 
stimulus measures should not be over-
stated. The big-envelope programmes in 
particular are typically temporary and 
only modestly redistributive (a six-month 
tax cut even of the most regressive taxes 
will do little to tackle inequality). Struc-
tural measures such as education or the 
design of consolidation policies will have 
longer-lasting effects.
2.3 GREEN
In designing recovery policies, govern-
ments should seek to prioritise low-car-
bon sectors, or to support carbon-inten-
sive companies only when ‘green strings’ 
are attached (von der Leyen, 2020; 
Gewessler et al, 2020). Ideas have already 
emerged about how to structure a green 
recovery: focus on energy efficiency of 
buildings, clean-energy infrastructure 
and clean transport to create well-paying 
local jobs that boost economic growth 
in the short-term, while at bringing 
long-term climate gains. In addition, 
investment in hydrogen and batteries 
should be boosted, to position Europe at 
the forefront of two technologies that are 
widely expected to be the next decade’s 
breakthrough (Birol and Timmermans, 
2020; La Camera, 2020)8.
All this is sensible, but a caveat is 
necessary: it’s been tried before. In 
the wake of the great financial crisis of 
2007-2008, the European Commission 
published a European Economic 
Recovery Plan aimed at speeding up the 
shift towards a low-carbon economy, 
with a focus on clean infrastructure, 
energy efficiency in buildings and green 
cars (European Commission, 2008). But 
the results of such initiatives have been 
unconvincing, with limited progress in 
housing renovation and clean cars since 
then (Tagliapietra et al, 2019).
Can it be different this time? Brought 
to the fore by growing public pressure 
on policymakers to green their recovery 
plans (Ipsos, 2020), and by low-carbon 
technology developments and cost 
reductions (Lazard, 2019), the green 
policies now widely accepted as provid-
ing the necessary energy savings and new 
energy sources are now poised to effec-
tively deliver large economic multipliers 
reasonably quickly, while contributing to 
reducing Europe’s emissions. 
3 GREEN THE RECOVERY BY 
COMMITTING TO HIGHER CARBON 
PRICES
While the first step toward a green re-
covery is to promote green policies that 
conform to necessary stimulus criteria, 
the greatest emphasis should be placed 
on altering market expectations. While 
the target of fiscal stimulus is to encour-
age consumption and investment today, 
the overarching objective in terms of 
greening the stimulus should be to show 
market agents that higher future pay-offs 
will arise from low-carbon investment.
There is a clear limit to the proportion 
of effective short-term stimulus that 
can be explicitly greened. In order to 
fulfil the typical criteria for a successful 
stimulus, a significant proportion of 
recovery packages is likely to be made up 
of broad-based, technologically-neutral 
measures, and measures that perpetuate 
status-quo economic activity, but neither 
clearly increase nor cut greenhouse gas 
emissions. Examples include temporary 
cuts to indirect taxation, wage subsidies, 
and increased generosity of social 
security payments. 
A European Central Bank (ECB, 
2010) decomposition of stimulus 
budgetary measures adopted by the 
euro area in 2009-2010 illustrates this 
point. Half of the total stimulus was 
for household measures: typically cuts 
to direct and indirect taxation, social 
security contributions, or direct income 
support. A little more than a quarter 
(28 percent) of stimulus came through 
public investment. Here, there are 
substantial opportunities for explicit 
greening, though the pre-COVID supply-
side position of the economy limits the 
proportion of public investment that can 
be explicitly green (ie the extent to which 
the necessary green skills and businesses 
currently exist to allow for green 
infrastructure programmes to be brought 
quickly to significant scale). Furthermore, 
public investment in green infrastructure 
projects will compete with similarly 
desirable investment in areas such as 
healthcare (inevitably higher than usual 
8. Given the difficulty in es-
timating recovery policies 
multipliers, Hepburn et al 
(2020) tried to identify pol-
icies with high potential in 
terms of both the economic 
multiplier and climate 
impact by surveying 231 
high-level policymakers 
and economic experts 
from G20 countries. The 
result was largely in line 
with what have become the 
standard green recovery 
ideas: clean infrastructure, 
building efficiency retrofits, 
investment in education 
and training, natural cap-
ital investment, and clean 
research and development. 
In their attempt to identify 
policies with high climate 
and recovery impact, the 
IEA’s Sustainable Recovery 
plan (IEA, 2020) also point-
ed to similar investment 
areas.
POLICY BRIEF GREENING THE RECOVERY BY GREENING THE FISCAL CONSOLIDATION5
on the list of priorities) or education.
The next largest share (17 percent) 
came in the form of business support, 
typically accelerated payment of VAT 
refunds, subsidies and export promotion. 
In this category, some explicit greening 
might be possible, but governments will 
largely take a broad approach, hoping to 
protect as many jobs as possible. Finally, 
at just 5 percent in 2009-2010, labour-
market policies are likely to make up a 
larger share of stimulus spending this 
time. There are indeed many valuable 
jobs that can and will be created within 
green industries, but governments will 
want to match as many unemployed 
workers to jobs as quickly as possible.
Given the significant difficulty 
associated with the explicit greening of 
a large proportion of recovery funds (ie 
everything outside of public investment), 
the most efficient tool to encourage 
broad cooperation in a green recovery 
will be strengthened efforts to increase 
the price of future carbon emissions. 
While today’s carbon price affects 
decisions on the use of carbon-intensive 
equipment, expected future carbon 
prices affect investment and divestment 
decisions. The size of stimulus packages 
about to be unleashed within the EU, and 
the fact that many businesses will look 
to restructure their business models and 
supply chains, mean that now more than 
ever carbon prices can play a significant 
role in shaping future economic systems. 
This is a key lesson from the response 
to the great financial crisis, when rela-
tively unsuccessful efforts were made to 
launch clean infrastructure programmes 
within economic environments with 
carbon prices that were unsupportive of 
those programmes. One of the lessons 
from the attempts to green the recovery 
in 2008-2009 is that stimulus funding will 
be most effective when aligned with long-
term price signals (IEA, 2020). 
When well communicated, 
households will take the future 
carbon price into account when using 
stimulus money to invest in new cars, 
housing renovation or heating systems. 
Companies that might be encouraged to 
invest by loose monetary conditions and 
broad fiscal support will consider the 
effect of increasing carbon prices on their 
investment projects. For instance, a high 
enough carbon price might encourage 
companies to invest in capital for 
producing technologies which will be key 
for low-carbon economies, such as heat 
pumps, smart meters and electrolysers, 
rather than internal combustion engines. 
Governments and financial insti-
tutions will take the carbon price into 
account when evaluating the business 
models of firms that seek debt restructur-
ing. And the decisions of some investors 
might encourage others to also pursue 
new low-carbon investment.
From a macro-economic perspective, 
stimulus measures aim to kickstart the 
economy now but will result in higher 
debt levels later. Consolidation will be 
needed, but it should only start after the 
recovery gained enough momentum. 
The fiscal consolidation need might be 
greater than 1 percent of GDP per year 
for several years9, meaning about €140 
billion per year for the EU.
4 ALTERING EXPECTATIONS  
For a successful ‘green consolidation’, 
in which governments seek to reduce 
high levels of public debt while placing a 
significant emphasis on raising revenue 
through taxation of carbon, EU carbon 
prices must increase significantly after 
2021. In practice there are two major 
tools to engineer this: the emission trad-
ing system (ETS) and the energy taxation 
directive (ETD, 2003/96/EC).
4.1 THE EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM 
The ETS covers large installations that 
are responsible for about half of EU 
emissions. Increasing the price in the 
emission trading system can be achieved 
by reducing the number of allowances 
put onto the market by member states. 
The price effect should largely exceed the 
volume effect, resulting in higher state 
revenues. An increase in the allowance 
price from about €25 /tonne of carbon 
dioxide currently to around €50 could be 
engineered by accelerating the annual 
linear reduction factor (currently 2.2 
percent). With a doubling of the carbon 
price, expected revenues in 2022 would 
increase from less than €25 to €50 billion. 
9. This is a rough estimate 
based on Barrios et al 
(2010), who wrote “a 
fiscal consolidation is 
considered as successful if 
it brings down the public 
debt level by at least five 
percentage points of GDP in 
the three years following a 
consolidation episode”. The 
exact figures will depend 
on many factors. Countries 
will not want to consolidate 
so quickly that is damages 
GDP growth, while an envi-
ronment of low borrowing 
costs might reduce consoli-
dation requirements.
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But as the allowance price is driven by 
the interplay of a relatively complex 
system, market expectations and political 
feedback loops, it will not be so easy to 
hit a concrete price target. 
One solution, which implies a 
stimulus of its own, would be to enable 
the European Investment Bank to provide 
financial guarantees to private investors 
that a certain level of carbon price will 
be achieved in 2025 or 2030. This would 
set a soft floor price for the ETS (see 
Zachmann, 2013). The EIB would sell 
options that would pay out the difference 
between whatever the ETS price is in 
2025 and a guaranteed price (eg €50), 
thus providing greater business certainty 
around low-carbon investment. 
However, credibly announcing a 
tightening of the ETS for after 2021 will 
not only lead to an increase in future 
emission allowance prices after the 
tightening is implemented, but will also 
encourage current market players to not 
sell/buy allowances below/above the 
higher price expected beyond 202210. 
Hence, today’s allowance prices would 
converge to the expected higher future 
price. This would act like an immediate 
tax increase11 and potentially counteract 
short-term economic stimulus 
programmes. This undesirable near-
term effect should be compensated 
for, to avoid climate policy being held 
responsible for a sluggish recovery. 
We think the ETS can be adapted in 
order to actually provide a Europe-wide 
stimulus in the short term without losing 
its most important function as guiding 
today’s investments towards ‘green’. The 
idea would be to tighten the allocation of 
allowances after 2021 by increasing the 
linear reduction factor from currently 
2.2 percent per year to a value consistent 
with a carbon price of €50/tonne in 2022. 
To counteract the backward-induced 
price increase already in 2020/2021, 
emitters in 2020/2021 would temporarily 
not need to surrender 100 allowances 
per 100 tons of CO2 equivalent, but 
only a slightly lower number (eg 95 
allowances)12. This would facilitate 
an increase in carbon cost after 2021, 
without this increase in price holding 
back the recovery. This strategy would 
essentially go beyond the ETS's automatic 
stabiliser function13 because it would 
engineer a temporary price-reduction 
that goes beyond the effect of change 
in long-term emissions. Moreover, it 
would be an EU wide programme based 
on an EU tool. The political problem is 
that this might sound like encouraging 
emissions in 2020-2021. Therefore, it 
must be very carefully communicated 
that the short-term stimulus is included 
only to counteract the backward-induced 
additional price increase.
4.2 THE ENERGY TAX ATION DIRECTIVE 
The ETD sets EU-wide minimum rates for 
national energy taxes (which are outside 
of the ETS). In 2015, the European Com-
mission withdrew its 2011 proposal to 
revise the ETD14 given the inability to find 
agreement between all EU countries15. 
The file was opened again in November 
2019, when the European Council took 
note of the European Commission eval-
uation, which concluded that the ETD of 
2003 is outdated, and requested that the 
Commission should come up with a new 
proposal16. The European Green Deal 
communication (European Commission, 
2019a) scheduled the revision for 2021. 
Accordingly, the speed and ambition 
of a compromise now largely depends 
on the political attention given to this 
topic – which could in our view be the 
most crucial climate policy question 
of this Commission’s mandate. A key 
improvement will be to ensure a stronger 
link between tax rates and the carbon 
content of fuels17.  
The main impact will be on transport 
and heating fuels18 (Figure 1). In 2018, 
transport and heating accounted for 
about 1.3 billion tonnes of CO2. Placing 
an additional €50 per tonne carbon 
price on those fuels would result in 
an additional €65 billion per year in 
revenues. In reality this number will 
be smaller, mainly19 because many EU 
countries already apply higher tax rates 
than the European minimum. Some 
countries with higher rates than the EU 
minimum might only have to slightly 
increase their tax rates, generating 
limited additional revenue. However, by 
imposing a higher floor, minimum rates 
10. Maybe with a slight dis-
count for the capital cost of 
carrying allowances, and 
some discount for the re-
maining uncertainty about 
future price developments.
11. That is, on the one hand 
higher government 
revenues from auctioning 
allowances and on the 
other hand higher costs 
for companies that are 
largely passed through 
into the prices consumer 
have to pay for carbon-in-
tensive goods – reducing 
the disposable income of 
consumers.
12. Other options would be to 
(i) introduce a forced ex-
change of old (issued until 
2021) into new (issued after 
2021) allowances at a cer-
tain change rate, eg 0.9; or 
(ii) instead of reducing the 
linear-reduction factor to 
tighten allocation, reduce 
the carbon value of all al-
lowances, eg to 0.9 tonnes 
of CO2 equivalent. But 
those options might be le-
gally more difficult as they 
imply reducing the value of 
property rights held by the 
current allowance owners.
13. The fact that emission 
allowance prices were 
unaffected by the crisis 
indicates that the ETS 
market stability reserve, 
introduced in 2019, 












17. This was already part of the 
proposal that member states 
previously rejected.
18. As electricity generation is 
already covered by the ETS.
19. Short-term price elasticity 
tends to be relatively low.
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Figure 1: Energy tax revenues of EU countries as percentage of 
total tax revenues, 2017
also reduce the extent to which certain 
member states can undercut those 
who are prepared to implement higher 
energy taxes. Member states with higher 
prices, which might now be hesitant 
about increasing such price differentials 
within the EU (because of fears of lost 
competitiveness), would now be afforded 
more scope for increasing prices.
Revising the ETD will be complex 
and it will take time to find a balanced, 
acceptable solution. But the European 
Council can already today commit to link 
a CO2-component in energy taxes to the 
ETS carbon price (probably with some 
delay for operational reasons). A credible 
announcement would give a strong indi-
cation to companies, financial markets, 
administrations and households.
4.3 LEGAL COMMITMENTS
Alongside explicit market mechanisms, 
the European Commission in March 2020 
proposed a law that would make binding 
in EU law the target of net-zero green-
house gas emissions across the bloc by 
2050. The process of passing this through 
the European Parliament and Council of 
the EU, and the accompanying noise it 
will generate, will provide a similarly im-
portant low-carbon signal to investors. In 
EU countries, national governments can 
make similar guarantees. For instance, 
within the automobile sector, commit-
ments to phase-out internal combustion 





The response to the COVID-19 crisis 
comes at a pivotal moment for the EU 
in its own efforts to address the climate 
crisis. Billions of euros of taxpayer’s 
money is set to be spent over the coming 
months and years in an effort to alleviate 
the pain of what might otherwise be the 
largest recession since the Great Depres-
sion. To the greatest degree possible, 
governments must direct such revenues 
to stimulus policies that boost depressed 
economies whilst contributing towards 
the transition to a zero-carbon economy. 
However, it is unrealistic to expect that 
governments are able to explicitly green 
all (or even most of) stimulus policies. 
A range of priorities, not least providing 
an immediate and sizeable boost to the 
economy, will compete with the green 
objective. The experiences of 2008-2009 
show that much stimulus spending is 
likely to be based on boosting demand 
within existing economic structures, 
rather than pursuing aggressive sup-
ply-side reform. This is where the concept 
of a ‘green consolidation’ will be funda-
mental to ensure a truly green recovery. 
Where explicit greening is not possible, 
implicit greening can be achieved by 
adjusting market expectations to a future 
world of higher carbon prices. 
In order to effectively green the 
fiscal consolidation, the EU will need to 
implement both a tightening of the ETS 
and a reform of the ETD. In our example, 
the annual additional revenue this could 
generate EU-wide could amount to €90 
billion. Granted, some of this revenue 
will be used to address the initial poten-
tially regressive effects of higher carbon 
prices. Yet, even taking this into account, 
it is clear that carbon pricing can make a 
non-trivial contribution to meeting the 
fiscal consolidation needs, which could 
be about 1 percent of GDP (ie €140 bil-
lion) per year. 
Carbon pricing has long been the 
economist’s favoured tool for reducing 
carbon emissions. However, given the 
current circumstances, an EU strategy 
of effective stimulus measures today, 
while allowing increases in future carbon 
prices to play the role of greener-in-chief, 
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Source: European Commission (2019b).
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